an investigation of the investigation into the 1981 New Cross Fire
Produced by MA students at the Centre for Research Architecture and facilitated by Stafford Scott & Kamara Scott, Guest Professors, Forensic Architecture, Goldsmiths University of London, 2022-23
How does the coroner
exercise the authority
of the state?
︎
The deaths of fourteen young people in the New Cross Massacre left the community heartbroken. Members of the community wanted justice, answers, and compassion— but they found none of these at the New Cross Fire inquests. The inquest system claims to be a proceeding to determine the facts as precisely as possible of the circumstances around suspicious deaths. But the structure of the coroner and inquest system allowed the negligence of Coroner Arthur Gordon Davies to obstruct the truth-finding process and, with the help of the Metropolitan Police, use the inquest stage to put the community itself on trial.
The harm done by the inquest process and the British justice system does not begin or end with the New Cross Fire inquests. The path to truth and justice through the state apparatus is characterised by institutional racism in the forms of bureaucracy, delays, and bad-faith actors.
By “investigating the investigation”, it is apparent that the system is structured such that it is difficult, almost impossible sometimes, for people to receive the justice they desire and deserve. Those failures are not confined to individuals but permeate through the whole web of actors and institutions involved. Institutional racism does not originate from a handful of authorities and their malpractice. Rather, it is a structural characteristic of the state apparatus.
The New Cross Fire Inquests
The bubble diagram is a research tool that maps out a complex network of people, organisations, and institutions involved in the New Cross Fire investigation. The visualisation of these relationships is illustrative of alliances and overlaps between organisations.
Each bubble represents a group or institution. Key actors of each group or institution are listed within the bubbles with their current title or position in the time period. The names of party attendees and family members of victims are redacted for privacy reasons. As some individuals and organisations are part of multiple communities or groups, they are shown at the intersection of different bubbles. The borders of each bubble vary between solid and dotted lines to represent its level of transparency and thin or thick lines to represent the relative difficulty (education, class, connections, and other barriers) of joining the group/institution.
The victims arecentred within the diagram and represented in inverted colours to show their importance as well as to acknowledge that their agency was taken away. The other bubbles are roughly organised by their direct or indirect relationship to the victims. Organisations with a direct relationship with the victims (like the community and the police) are positioned closer to the victims, while organisations with indirect relationships (like the media) are further away in the drawing. The state institutions are organised vertically to show a chain of command and power.
Through the development of this tool, we found that members of the community often occupied multiple positions as directly affected community members, activists, and those involved in knowledge distribution (media). Members of powerful institutions often played similar, harmful roles in other investigations, for example, Police Commander Graham Stockwell’s record of abuse and Coroner Arthur Gordon Davies’ record of questionable work in inquests.
It is our hope that conceptualising this network can be a valuable way of understanding the distribution of accountability among state institutions as well as the impressive involvement and effort of community groups and organisations in seeking justice and providing care for themselves.
Coroners preside over inquests (fact-finding investigations into deaths under suspicious circumstances). The powers of the coroner were established primarily in the 1887 Coroners Act. This act was followed by the 1927 Coroners Rules, 1953 Coroners Rules, and a series of reforms.
Coroners have unique powers which grant them considerable oversight over how an inquest proceeds. It is within their scope to:
Decide which witnesses are called
What questions can be asked at the inquest
The order of evidence
Decision to call a jury
Select the jury
Sole right to sum up evidence to the jury
Direct the jury on what verdicts may be appropriate to render in a case1
1 Benn, "Justice must be seen to be done." The National Archives, HO 299/135.
Three main complaints were issued against the coroner of the New Cross Fire, Arthur Gordon Davies, and thus the inquest proceedings. These complaints concerned (1) his misleading of the jury as to potential verdicts available to be rendered, (2) his use of police statements during the inquest, and (3) his lack of note-taking during the inquest.2 In what follows, we provide an in-depth discussion of these complaints.
1. VERDICT Coroner Davies limited the ability of the jury to produce a satisfactory verdict by directing them toa narrow method of determining and presenting the verdict. The jury was directed by the coroner that three possible verdicts were available: unlawful killing, accidental death, and open verdict. Coroner Davies directed the jury to first ascertain where the fire originated.
He directed them that if the fire originated from the outside, the only possible verdict should be unlawful killing. If the fire's origin was inside the house, they should determine whether it was intentional (and if so they should render an unlawful killing verdict) or accidental (and if so render an accidental death verdict).3
This direction by the coroner foreclosed the possibility that evidence could point to an intentionally set fire without knowing where it originated. In such a ruling, the verdict would be unlawful killing, and allow a criminal proceeding to take place, despite some uncertainties.
Inquest rules also allowed juries to render their verdict in phrase form, not necessarily choosing a verdict from a list. According to AMC Inglese in a letter to RJ Phillips:
…the coroner’s jury retains power in an appropriate case to return a modified version of a verdict on the list of suggested verdicts or to return a different verdict altogether. [...] Thus, a verdict that (without drafting) C.D. was killed unlawfully as a result of a fire bomb being thrown through the window by a person unknown would be possible in the Deptford case if the facts supported it.4
Therefore, Davies boxed the jury into a rigid list of options which prevented a more holistic ruling.
2 Unknown, "No new inquest into Deptford fire deaths." The National Archives, HO 299/135. 3 Ibid. 4 AMC Inglese to RJ Phillips, June 23, 1982. The National Archives HO 299/135.
Unknown, "No new inquest into Deptford fire deaths." The National Archives, HO 299/13
2.
USE OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
Many of the witness statements the police collected during the investigation were taken under duress and later retracted. Despite this, the coroner used these during the inquest. Moreover, he used statements not entered into evidence.
Witness statements were read directly when questioning the witnesses as well, rather than informing the line of questioning.5
This practice is directly discouraged in the Recommendations on Procedure 1975 by the Coroner's Society of England and Wales:
The coroner should not show the witness his police statement or read out the police statement and ask the witness if that is true.6
The practice of leading witnesses by reading from statements is counter-intuitive to the purpose of an inquest, which is to determine the circumstances and information around a death with as much clarity as possible.
AMC Inglese to RJ Phillips, June 23, 1982.
The National Archives HO 299/135.
3. NOTES
The Coroners Rules stipulate that coroners must take notes at inquests. The notes serve as a record of the proceedings as well as material which the coroner uses during the course of the inquest to sum up the evidence given to the jury. Coroner Davies did not take notes. Instead, he annotated witness statements taken by police and recorded the proceedings on a tape which was not transcribed.
The Recommendations on Procedure 1975 by the Coroner's Society of England and Wales writes:
…it is essential that the coroner's notes show the true statement of the witness…
It is also improper to use the police statements as the Coroner’s notes by putting in amendments as the witness gives evidence.7
Documentation of the trial is only available to the public because of media coverage and the efforts of John La Rose taking notes at the trial.
5. Rickford. "'I made errors'--fire coroner." The National Archives, HO 299/135. 6. Coroner’s Society of England and Wales. Recommendations on Procedure 1975. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
7. Ibid.
Coroner’s Society of England and Wales. Recommendations on Procedure 1975. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
Collaboration between the Office of the Coroner and the Metropolitan Police was already typical in London, but Coroner Davies went beyond this in the course of the 1981 inquest and subsequent hearing, allowing police documentation to significantly steer the proceedings.
Rollo, "Open Verdict Upheld." The National Archives HO 299/135
JURY SELECTION Jury selection within the Coroner's Office was carried out by the "coroner's officer" until 1984. In London this position is usually held by a former or current member of the Metropolitan Police.8
VERDICTS The jury's ability to add specificity to their verdicts through the use of riders was, according to Melissa Benn, "prohibited after the Blair Peach case, where the jury added strong riders about the conduct of the Special Patrol Group.”9By hindering the expression of the jury, the court was able to curb critiques of the Met.
DOCUMENTATION Coroner Davies' choice to use police statements to direct his questioning in the 1981 inquest prioritised police narratives, particularly the theory that the fire had been started by a fight among party attendees.10
One of the main complaints against the Coroner was that he had not taken notes during the course of the inquest. It was argued that he had recorded the proceedings on tape and the requirement was thus satisfied. However, a transcription of this recording was not produced in court. Instead, a secret transcription taken by police was provided in the subsequent hearing.11 The Metropolitan Police also prepared “...a number of statements…for possible use during the inquest,” according to a letter from RJ Phillips to Miss Wakefield Richmond of the Home Office.12
RJ Phillips to Miss Wakefield Richmond, November 14, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
8 Benn, "Justice must be seen to be done." The National Archives, HO 299/135.
9 Ibid. 10 Rollo, "Open Verdict Upheld." The National Archives HO 299/135
11 Ibid. 12 RJ Phillips to Miss Wakefield Richmond, November 14, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
Despite an acknowledgement of the Coroner's errors and misconduct in the course of the inquest, he was defended publicly by High Court judges and the media. In an article titled “I made errors,” fire coroner, Frankie Rickford writes:
Dr. Arthur Gordon Davies accepted he used material from police statements which had not been given in sworn evidence at the inquest in his summing up to the jury. [...] But, said Mr Brooks, "he was doing the best he could.” [...] The coroner also admitted he had breached rule 30…13
Rickford. "'I made errors'--fire coroner." The National Archives, HO 299/135.
"Blaze Parents' Court Fury." Sun (UK), July 9, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/135.
Moreover, in the Sun article, “Blaze Parents’ Court Fury”:
Lord Lane... praised Gordon Davies for conducting the inquest "with commendable skill, forbearance and tact.14
13 Rickford. "'I made errors'--fire coroner." The National Archives, HO 299/135. 14 "Blaze Parents' Court Fury." Sun (UK), July 9, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/135.
SOUTHWARK CORONERS OFFICE: RECORD OF COMPLAINTS
CORONER GORDON DAVIES
Coroner Gordon Davies had a record of complaints in an "exceptionally large number of cases" according to a letter from Tony Ward on behalf of Inquest: Campaigns for Justice.15
Ward writes:
So great is the dissatisfaction at the conduct of inquests at Southwark Coroner's Court (where Dr. Davies presides) that last year about 100 people attended a public meeting to protest about the court.16
Despite a record of significant lack of confidence in Davies' abilities as coroner, his position was extended multiple times past the coroner's legal retirement age of 65.17
Additionally, although coroners are appointed and paid by local councils, they are employed directly under the Crown. Councils must go through an involved process to remove them from office and deputy coroners, not paid by the council, cannot be removed by them at all. Thus, there is little local oversight on coroners, despite any lack of approval for them amongst the public.18
Tony Ward to Mr. Chambers, January 30, 1983. The National Archives, LCO 65/498.
Iain Roxburgh to Sir Wilfrid, May 22,1984, pp. 1. The National Archives, LCO 65/498.
DEPUTY CORONER: COMPLAINTS
The Deputy Coroner, Dr. Foster, was also the subject of critique. Dr. Foster took on an irregularly large portion of Davies's work. In the National Archives records there are complaints against Foster filed with those against Davies. Two complaints in particular were levied by the group Inquest: United Campaigns for Justice in 1984—the death of Mr. Bardon (no first name given) and the death of Mr. Arthur Neal, who died in police custody in 1983.19
15 Tony Ward to Mr. Chambers, January 30, 1983. The National Archives, LCO 65/498. 16 Ibid. 17 Iain Roxburgh to Sir Wilfrid, May 22,1984, pp. 1. The National Archives, LCO 65/498. 18 Ibid. 19 Tony Ward to D.T. Chambers, February 29, 1984. The National Archives, LCO 65/498.
The British Inquest System: 1887 to Today
Swipe to scroll through the timeline.
Credit: Dafni Karavola
Credit: Dafni Karavola
The timeline, spanning from 1887 to today, is organized around the New Cross Fire, other investigations into racially motivated crimes, and murders in state custody. The killings of Blair Peach and Stephen Lawrence are highlighted as case studies due to their shared racist motives and their multiple intertwined connections to the New Cross Fire. The timeline aims to investigate those investigations and connect the specificities of these cases with a larger pattern of structural racism. To that end, it examines the involvement of different state institutions and actors throughout these cases.
The timeline starts with the institutions of the Coroner and other types of inquiries, which claim to be responsible for defining the particularities surrounding the deaths. It then focuses on two individual Coroners, Arthur Gordon Davies and John Burton, who led the inquiries into the New Cross Fire and Blair Peach’s death, respectively. Legislation and rules related to Coroners’ inquiries and their evolution from 1887 to today are of great importance in determining to what extent those Coroners acted in bad faith and how the system’s structure is full of “failures.” But the Coroners are not the only ones involved. The police, multiple judicial authorities, and the government occupy a defining role in the course of justice or its abstraction.
The timeline also follows the campaigns launched by the families of the deceased, accompanied by friends, supporters and movements, in their quest for truth. Paying attention to each campaign’s demands throughout the investigations and inquiries is of the utmost importance, as it gives voice to those most affected and emphasises what they believe should be done.
Finally, the timeline highlights connections between events. The dashed lines follow the evolutionary course of events of a similar nature (such as amendments to legislation or follow-ups on inquiries in the same case). The red diagonal lines link events across time, actors and cases. They propose multiple readings of the timeline, illustrating the deeply interwoven nature of the cases, establishing patterns of violence and injustice, and unifying a narrative that accents the past and future of the New Cross Fire investigation.
The standardisation of verdicts in a short-formed list (misadventure, suicide, open verdict, etc.) was first proposed in the 1887 Coroner’s Act20 to collect more accurate statistics and avoid any uncertainties about verdicts.21 However, as AMC Inglese mentions, a “coroner's jury retains power in a modified version of a verdict on the list or even a different verdict altogether.”22 One of the ways the jury could clarify the short-form verdicts was by adding riders.
After the Blair Peach case (1979), “where the jury added strong riders about the conduct of the Special Patrol Group”23 in a “death by misadventure”24 verdict, adding riders was prohibited. However, this change is not represented in subsequent legislation.
According to Rule 33 in the 1953 Coroner’s Rules,25 no verdict may suggest any criminal or civil liability. In other words, coroners or juries are not allowed to name those at fault, as a Coroner’s inquest is not a judiciary procedure. Since inquests cannot determine culpability, it is critical to establish as much specificity as possible around the circumstances of the death. A more descriptivenarrative verdict is thus crucial.
Both inquests for the New Cross Fire (1981 and 2004) returned an open verdict.26 Inglese admits that “a verdict of unlawful killing in the New Cross Fire case would look odd if the jury were certain who threw the bomb but could not name him because of Rule 33.”27 A more descriptive verdict (narrative verdict) was only made available in 2009.28
Additionally, until 1984, the Coroners held the power to decide if juries (of their selection) would be present at inquests. This changed with the Coroners’ Juries Act (1984),29 when jury selection became random. However, it was only after 2009 that the coroner had to automatically hold a juried inquest for deaths in custody or state detention. This requirement does not cover racially motivated attacks.30 20 Coroners Act, 1887, Chapter: Expenses and Returns of Inquests, Section 28. Full-text available https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1887/71/pdfs/ukpga_18870071_en.pdf 21 ACM Inglese writes, “….the move towards standardisation was increased by section 28 of the Coroners Act 1887, which obliges the coroner to make an annual return to the Secretary of State, ‘in such form and containing such particulars as the Secretary of State from time to time directs, of all cases in which as inquest has been held by him’. The list of suggested verdicts in Form 18 corresponds with that on the coroner’s annual return form and enables more accurate statistics to be kept, avoiding overlap between different verdicts.” Found in the National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Inglese, ACM. 23/06/1982 22 Ibid 23 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Benn, M. “Justice must be seen to be done” New Statesman, 16/09/1982. Also, according to Unknown, “1980: Peach death was 'misadventure'”, BBC, 27/05/1980 available here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/27/newsid_3023000/3023595.stm “The verdict came with three riders: that there should be more control of the Special Patrol Group (SPG) police unit by officers, that there should be better liaison with local police, and that no unauthorised weapons should be available in police stations.” 24 Unknown, “1980: Peach death was 'misadventure'”, BBC, 27/05/1980 25 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Inglese, ACM. 23/06/1982 26 Pallister, David, “Coroner repeats open verdict on New Cross Fire” The Guardian, 07/05/2004 and The George Patmore Institute “New Cross Massacre Campaign” https://www.georgepadmoreinstitute.org/collections/new-cross-massacre-campaign-1980-1985 27 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Inglese, ACM. 23/06/1982
28 Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, Section 10(2) available here: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/section/10 29 National Archives, Complaint Against the Coroner, Ward, T., 29/02/1984 30 Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, Section 1(2) available here: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/section/1
Reforms of the Coroner system have been called for by various institutions, albeit with different motives.
Truth campaigns have repeatedly questioned verdict lists due to their inability to describe the deaths' circumstances accurately and deliver justice. During the New Cross Fire investigation, Melissa Benn publicly called for reforms, accusing the system of having “such severe structural faults that fail to command public confidence.”31 She suggested bringing back riders to allow more open-ended verdicts and argued for the jury to “not be randomly selected but with a balance of age, sex and geographical distribution and be open to challenge.”32 A more balanced jury could minimise discrimination in comparison to a random one, as it is composed of people with a deeper understanding of the issues at hand.
The Coroners’ Society also pushed for reforms. In a letter to the Home Office33 in January 1982, following the New Cross Fire, John Burton (the head of the Society) called for inquest juries to be abolished and the verdict to be delivered only by the coroner. If this is not possible, he proposed the creation of a narrative verdict and random jury selection. Coroner Burton had a long history of arguing against juries at inquests. He repeatedly refused the family’s request for a jury in the Peach case, which he presided over.34
The Home Office, replying to the Coroners’ Society letter, insisted that the jury is a symbol with popular appeal and cannot be abolished as findings were more acceptable if given by a jury. Moreover, a narrative verdict would cause discussion and appeals. Legislation would be considered for random juries in the future.35
On the one hand, the Coroners’ Society’s interests lay in avoiding public accountability, either by a legislative framework that would assert their authority or one that would deflect responsibility for the outcome. On the other hand, the government used the jury as a representation of the “social contract” to ease and avoid the public’s dissatisfaction with rulings. 31 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Benn, M. “Justice must be seen to be done” New Statesman, 16/09/1982 32 Ibid. 33 National Archives, New Cross Fire Investigations, Burton, J., 20/01/1982 34 Pallister, David "Inquest told 'Blair was beaten in police truncheon charge'" The Guardian, 12/10/1979 35 National Archives, New Cross Fire Investigations, Home Office Private Secretary, 12/02/1982
As inquests and inquiries do not assign criminal liability, they provide an illusion of accountability and closure but no actual framework for convictions or consequences for the perpetrators. In the case of Steven Lawrence’s murder, a Public Inquiry resulted in an unlawful killing verdict,36 but all suspects were acquitted due to lack of evidence.37 This is not an isolated incident. Among the twenty-four closed cases of deaths in custody presented in the “Rest in Power” project created by the 4Front Project,38 ten have been ruled as unlawful killings, and only one (D. Atkinson) resulted in a conviction. All other cases never made their way to the Court.
In all three contested cases presented in the timeline, the Court found no adequate evidence deriving from either police investigations or coroners’ inquests to prosecute or address murder charges.39 Both before and after an inquest, it is a judicial responsibility to begin prosecution based on police investigations and evidence, which are incomplete in most of the examined cases. However, even when the police provide indicators of criminal liability, judicial authorities seem unwilling to act upon them.
Moreover, the judicial authorities have maintained a hostile position against families’ complaints, demands, and applications. In the New Cross Fire case, the court denied the family’s request to quash the original inquest,40 even though the family’s claims were in accordance with the Coroners’ laws.41 In 1984 the Director of Public Prosecutions (PDD) refused to demand the extradition of Norman Higgins,42 a key witness discovered by the police’s second investigation. Shortly after, the DPP announced a lack of evidence to prosecute.43 In the Peach case, the Crown Prosecution services (CPS) found the evidence insufficient to charge,44 even though the police’s own report (by Officer Cass) implied their culpability in the murder.45 Ten years later, the Court of Appeals denied the Peach family’s claim to release the Cass report in full,46 even though it was their right according to Rule 39 of the 1953 Coroners’ Rules.47 Similarly, in the Lawrence case, CPS was repeatedly reluctant to take action against the perpetrators, as well as the considerable evidence against police corruption and cover-ups.48
A significant change occurred with the abolition of the double jeopardy rule in 2005.49This legislation permitted all acquitted persons to be retried if new evidence was presented. It was activated in the Lawrence case, resulting in actual conviction.50However, it cannot be applied to cases in which no one was accused, such as the New Cross Fire and the Blair Peach case. 36 Stephen Lawrence Day” official website https://stephenlawrenceday.org/stephens-story/ 37 Travis, Alan “Race murder charges dropped”, The Guardian, 30/07/1993, available here: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1993/jul/30/lawrence.ukcrime 38 The 4Front Project, “Rest in Power” https://www.4frontproject.org/rest-in-power 39 Pallister, D. "Anger at DPP's decision on Peach death" The Guardian 4/10/1979 40 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, “No new inquest into Deptford fire deaths” 41 Coroners Act, 1887, Section 6b, Full-text available https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1887/71/pdfs/ukpga_18870071_en.pdf 42 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Weeks, John. “Deptford fire inquiry leads to New York” The Telegraph, 08/05/1984 43 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Cleary, J.D., 22/11/1985 44 Pallister, David. "Anger at DPP's decision on Peach death" The Guardian 4/10/1979 45 Cass, John “Second Report: Death of Blair Peach”, Metropolitan Police, 14/09/1979, available to download in parts here: https://www.met.police.uk/foi-ai/af/accessing-information/met/investigation-into-the-death-of-blair-peach/ and McNee, David “McNee's Law” London, Collins,1983 46 Dummett, Michael “The Death of Blair Peach: the Supplementary Report of the Unofficial Committee of Enquiry” National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1980
47 National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Benn, M. “No new inquest into Deptoford fire deaths”
48 Unknown, “Lawrence detective denies claim” BBC News, 31/07/2006, available here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5232372.stm
Unknown, “Stephen Lawrence murder: Met Police officers could face criminal charges”, BBC News, 03/11/2020 49 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, Section 13 (enforced 2005), available here: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/section/13 50 Stephen Lawrence Day” official website https://stephenlawrenceday.org/stephens-story/ and Dodd, Vikram; Laville, Sandra. "Stephen Lawrence verdict: Dobson and Norris guilty of racist murder". The Guardian. 03/01/2012
As a result, it falls on the police’s lap to investigate and acquire all necessary evidence, possibly leading to a conviction. However, in cases of police violence (the Peach case), fascist action (the Lawrence case), or possibly racially motivated crimes (such as the New Cross Fire), the hope of an institutionally racist apparatus delivering justice is inherently contradictory.
Moreover, the multiple allegations of racism, witness coercion, evidence withdrawal, and neglect found in all three cases are manifested in the Undercover Police scandal,51 which started in 2013 and is still being investigated. The investigation revealed that the undercover police infiltrated the Lawrence family and tried to smear the campaign's credibility.52Similarly, they monitored Celia Stubbs, Peach’s partner, for over twenty years.53 51 Undercover Policing Inquiry, official website https://www.ucpi.org.uk/52 Oral statement to Parliament, “The Ellison Review”, 06/03/2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-ellison-review 53 Evans, Rob "Met spied on partner of Blair Peach for more than two decades, inquiry hears" The Guardian 06/05/2021, available here: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/may/06/met-spied-on-blair-peach-partner-for-more-than-two-decades-inquiry-hears
The Government’s role has been extremely limited. Instead of actively engaging, they commissioned prominent figures such as Lord Leslie George Scarman,54 Sir William McPherson,55 and Mark Elliot56 to produce independent reports on race and police corruption. While some of the reports admitted the existence of institutional racism and cover-ups,57the government never fully deployed these landmark reports as they should have. Instead, among other notable declarations,58they compose a mosaic of carefully curated actions of minimal effect, used to disperse people’s rage and mistrust. 54 Williams, D.G.T. “The Brixton Disorders”, The Cambridge Law Journal, April 1982 55 McPherson, William, “ The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry”, February 1999. Full text https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111 /4262.pdf 56 Oral statement to Parliament, “The Ellison Review”, 06/03/2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-ellison-review 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.
Most importantly, this timeline shows how time is weaponised against communities. Bureaucracy and delays characterise the investigations, inquests, and judicial procedures. As a result, most cases stretch across time and have long periods of inactivity from one set of events to the next, sometimes exceeding the lifetime of the actors involved. In the Peach case, for example, Coroner Burton, who started the original inquest, died in 2004,59 fifteen years before the last update on the case was released.60
However, truth campaigns do not afford the luxury of languor. People who constitute them are forced to constantly revive traumatic memories and struggle for justice and closure; simultaneously, they endure the slow violence of waiting and being held static. Movements are forced to demonstrate an inexhaustible continuity and endless allocation of resources, similar to the one the state has. 59 Nikki Davies, Anthony “Gordon Davies: GP, barrister, expert witness and inventor, he was a man of old-fashioned values and great intellect”, The Guardian, 06/05/2008, available here: https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2008/may/06/3 60 Evans, Rob "Met spied on partner of Blair Peach for more than two decades, inquiry hears" The Guardian 06/05/2021, available here: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/may/06/met-spied-on-blair-peach-partner-for-more-than-two-decades-inquiry-hears
The New Cross Fire Inquests
Benn, Melissa. “Justice must be seen to be done.” New Statesmen, July 16, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/135.
Rollo, Joanna. “Open Verdict Upheld.” New Statesmen, July 16, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/135.
Rickford, Frankie. "'I made errors'--fire coroner." The National Archives, HO 299/135.
"Blaze Parents' Court Fury." Sun (UK), July 9, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/135.
"No new inquest into Deptford fire deaths." Times (UK), July 9, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
Inglese, AMC. AMC Inglese to RJ Phillips, London, UK, June 23, 1982.
Coroner’s Society of England and Wales. Recommendations on Procedure 1975. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
Ward, Tony. Tony Ward to Mr. Chambers, London, UK, January 30, 1983. The National Archives, LCO 65/498, pp. 4.
Roxburgh, Iain. Iain Roxburgh to Sir Wilfrid, London, UK, May 22,1984. The National Archives, LCO 65/498, pp.6.
Ward, Tony. Tony Ward to D.T. Chambers, London, UK, February 29, 1984. The National Archives, LCO 65/498, pp. 5.
Huebner, M.D. Note for File: The Greater London Council, Dr. A. G. Davies, Coroner. September 10, 1984. Page 2. The National Archives, LCO 65/498, pp. 30.
Phillips, RJ. RJ Phillips to Miss Wakefield Richmond, London, UK, November 14, 1982. The National Archives, HO 299/13.
The British Inquest System: 1887 to Today
Coroners Act, 1887, Chapter: Expenses and Returns of Inquests, Section 28. Full-text available https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1887/71/pdfs/ukpga_18870071_en.pdf
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, Section 10(2)
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, Section 1(2).
Coroners Act, 1887, Section 6b, Full-text available https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1887/71/pdfs/ukpga_18870071_en.pdf
National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Inglese, ACM. 23/06/1982
National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Benn, M. “Justice must be seen to be done” New Statesman, 16/09/1982
National Archives, Complaint Against the Coroner, Ward, T., 29/02/1984
National Archives, New Cross Fire Investigations, Burton, J., 20/01/1982
National Archives, New Cross Fire Investigations, Home Office Private Secretary, 12/02/1982
National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, “No new inquest into Deptford fire deaths”
National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Weeks, John. “Deptford fire inquiry leads to New York” The Telegraph, 08/05/1984
National Archives, New Cross Fire High Court Decision on Reopening Inquest, Cleary, J.D., 22/11/1985
Timmins, Nicholas "Tighter police control urged in Peach misadventure verdict" The Times, 28/05/1980
Pallister, David, “Coroner repeats open verdict on New Cross Fire” The Guardian, 07/05/2004
Travis, Alan “Race murder charges dropped”, The Guardian, 30/07/1993
Pallister, David "Inquest told 'Blair was beaten in police truncheon charge'" The Guardian, 12/10/1979
Pallister, D. "Anger at DPP's decision on Peach death" The Guardian, 4/10/1979
"Law Report: Statements to be disclosed in police complaint" The Times, 05/02/1986
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